It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? 0000002169 00000 n Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. [28] Once this Pandoras Box is opened, it will be difficult to close. Nash Equilibrium Examples On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. The dilemma is that if one hunter waits, he risks one of his fellows killing the hare for himself, sacrificing everyone else. Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." Another proposed principle of rationality ("maximin") suggests that I ought to consider the worst payoff I could obtain under any course of action, and choose that action that maximizes . What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? [30], Today, government actors have already expressed great interest in AI as a transformative technology. 0000001656 00000 n What is the difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide? It comes with colossal opportunities, but also threats that are difficult to predict. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. How do strategies of non-violent resistance view power differently from conventional 'monolithic' understandings of power? Each model is differentiated primarily by the payoffs to cooperating or defecting for each international actor. [31] Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council: Committee on Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Executive Office of the President of the United States (October 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy Executive Office of the President of the United States (December 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-Automation-Economy.PDF. Julian E. Barnes and Josh Chin, The New Arms Race in AI, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; Cecilia Kang and Alan Rappeport, The New U.S.-China Rivalry: A Technology Race, March 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/us-china-trade-technology-deals.html. Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. 0000009614 00000 n Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. [48] Denise Garcia and Monica Herz, Preventive Action in World Politics, Global Policy 7, 3(2016): 370379. [28] Armstrong et al., Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence development.. Another example is the hunting practices of orcas (known as carousel feeding). [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). Table 5. Next, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. endstream endobj 1 0 obj <> endobj 2 0 obj [/PDF/Text] endobj 3 0 obj <> endobj 8 0 obj <> endobj 9 0 obj <>stream Posted June 3, 2008 By Presh Talwalkar. This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). A major terrorist attack launched from Afghanistan would represent a kind of equal opportunity disaster and should make a commitment to establishing and preserving a capable state of ultimate value to all involved. In chapter 6 of Man, the State, and War, precursor of the anarchical view of international relations, and an extension of the stag-hunt example: 0000006962 00000 n a Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? This may not amount to a recipe for good governance, but it has meant the preservation of a credible bulwark against state collapse. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. Whereas the short-term impact of AI depends on who controls it, the long-term impact depends now whether it can be controlled at all.[26]. in . hTIOSQ>M2P22PQFAH Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. 0000003027 00000 n This same dynamic could hold true in the development of an AI Coordination Regime, where actors can decide whether to abide by the Coordination Regime or find a way to cheat. Some observers argue that a precipitous American retreat will leave the countryand even the capital, Kabulvulnerable to an emboldened, undeterred Taliban given the limited capabilities of Afghanistans national security forces. For instance, if the expected punishment is 2, then the imposition of this punishment turns the above prisoner's dilemma into the stag hunt given at the introduction. They suggest that new weapons (or systems) that derive from radical technological breakthroughs can render a first strike more attractive, whereas basic arms buildups provide deterrence against a first strike. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. Advanced AI technologies have the potential to provide transformative social and economic benefits like preventing deaths in auto collisions,[17] drastically improving healthcare,[18] reducing poverty through economic bounty,[19] and potentially even finding solutions to some of our most menacing problems like climate change.[20]. The academic example is the Stag Hunt. > Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. But who can we expect to open the Box? 0000002790 00000 n How can the security dilemma be mitigated and transcended? 4 thoughts on " The Six-Party Talks as a Game Theoretic 'Stag-Hunt' (2): For example international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Cooperation under the security dilemma. Actor As preference order: DC > CC > CD > DD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DC > DD. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only pure Nash equilibrium is when both players choose to defect. Finally, a Stag Hunt occurs when the returns for both actors are higher if they cooperate than if either or both defect. Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. If a hunter leaps out and kills the hare, he will eat, but the trap laid for the stag will be wasted and the other hunters will starve. Before getting to the theory, I will briefly examine the literature on military technology/arms racing and cooperation. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. endstream endobj 76 0 obj <>stream If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. Finally, I discuss the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory in practice. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. Evaluate this statement. Payoff matrix for simulated Deadlock. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. What is the key claim of the 'Liberal Democratic Peace' thesis? For the cooperator (here, Actor B), the benefit they can expect to receive from cooperating would be the same as if both actors cooperated [P_(b|B) (AB)b_Bd_B]. Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 1. This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? Here if they all act together they can successfully reproduce, but success depends on the cooperation of many individual protozoa. What should Franks do? This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. [29] There is a scenario where a private actor might develop AI in secret from the government, but this is unlikely to be the case as government surveillance capabilities improve. HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC xref The hunters hide and wait along a path. d Learn how and when to remove these template messages, Learn how and when to remove this template message, "Uses of Game Theory in International Relations", "On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt", "Stag Hunt: Anti-Corruption Disclosures Concerning Natural Resources", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stag_hunt&oldid=1137589086, Articles that may contain original research from November 2018, All articles that may contain original research, Articles needing additional references from November 2018, All articles needing additional references, Wikipedia articles that are too technical from July 2018, Articles with multiple maintenance issues, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0, This page was last edited on 5 February 2023, at 12:51. If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. These differences create four distinct models of scenarios we can expect to occur: Prisoners Dilemma, Deadlock, Chicken, and Stag Hunt. {\displaystyle a>b\geq d>c} [8] Elsa Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence, Lawfare, June 20, 2017, https://www.lawfareblog.com/beyond-cfius-strategic-challenge-chinas-rise-artificial-intelligence (highlighting legislation considered that would limit Chinese investments in U.S. artificial intelligence companies and other emerging technologies considered crucial to U.S. national security interests). These talks involve a wide range of Afghanistans political elites, many of whom are often painted as a motley crew of corrupt warlords engaged in tribalized opportunism at the expense of a capable government and their own countrymen. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U 695 0 obj For Rousseau, in his famous parable of the stag hunt, war is inevitable because of the security dilemma and the lack of trust between states. Table 4. The payoff matrix in Figure 1 illustrates a generic stag hunt, where Since this requires that the fish have no way to escape, it requires the cooperation of many orcas. %PDF-1.7 % An example of norm enforcement provided by Axelrod (1986: 1100) is of a man hit in the face with a bottle for failing to support a lynching in the Jim Crow South. This means that it remains in U.S. interests to stay in the hunt for now, because, if the game theorists are right, that may actually be the best path to bringing our troops home for good. As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. [4] In international law, countries are the participants in a stag hunt. Payoff matrix for simulated Prisoners Dilemma. Structural Conflict Prevention refers to a compromosde of long term intervention that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institional factors that could lead to conflict. Here, I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. The second technology revolution caused World War II. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. Those who play it safe will choose Finally, in a historical survey of international negotiations, Garcia and Herz[48] propose that international actors might take preventative, multilateral action in scenarios under the commonly perceived global dimension of future potential harm (for example the ban on laser weapons or the dedication of Antarctica and outer space solely for peaceful purposes). f(x)={332(4xx2)if0x40otherwisef(x)= \begin{cases}\frac{3}{32}\left(4 x-x^2\right) & \text { if } 0 \leq x \leq 4 \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} Using game theoretical representations of state preferences, Downs et al. Understanding the Stag Hunt Game: How Deer Hunting Explains Why People are Socially Late. Payoff variables for simulated Stag Hunt, Table 14. This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. Competition for AI superiority at national level most likely cause of WW3 imo.. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. As an advocate of structural realism, Gray[45] questions the role of arms control, as he views the balance of power as a self-sufficient and self-perpetuating system of international security that is more preferable. The story is briey told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality: "If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach folsom dam failure inundation map, leicester square nightclub 1980s, theme park tycoon 2 nausea,
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stag hunt example international relations